Marta Jaroszewicz, seniour research fellow at Centre for Eastern Studies (Poland), presents the reserch paper on V4 states’ visa liberalization policies. The author highlights the main challenges the EU project in Eastern Europe faced with. The author notes that the Vishegrad states could play the special role in liberalization of the visa-regime between the EU and the Eastern European countries and suggests several measures which could be taken in this area.
Visa and mobility issues are the EU’s most tangible incentive for its Eastern neighbors. Yet the EU conditions the loodening of restrictions on free travel by in-depth reforms in the partner countries. This has to change and the V4 could play the stronger role in this process
Democratic backsliding and disputes over the expansion of Russia-led integration projects in the post-Soviet area will probably mark the current year more than any rapprochement between the EU and Ukraine or Belarus. Pro-European Moldova may be a praiseworthy exception, though the Parliament’s recent decision to dismiss the government may slow down the rapprochement with the EU. The EU project in Eastern Europe is not dead, but it has been facing fundamental challenges. The EU remains weakened by economic problems and de-integration slogans arising on all sides, while setbacks to democratization in Ukraine and progressing authoritarian tendencies in Belarus are increasingly more apparent. In that situation, the EU has been putting more focus on assisting civil society in Eastern Europe, mindful that the intended externalization of EU standards in the Eastern neighborhood is not possible if local governments are not willing to adopt those standards.
EU conditionality
A conditionality-based approach – EU rewards based on reforms in the partner country – has been used in the visa and mobility sphere despite the fact that visas mainly impact societies, not governments. Ukraine and Moldova, and in future another four countries with which the EU cooperates under the Eastern Partnership (EaP) framework, are offered visa-free access to the EU only if they carry out serious reforms of their law enforcement and justice sector. These reforms would affect the essence of the state’s functioning. It is highly questionable whether states with democracy deficits and problems with the rule of law are capable of such a transformation in the short-term. Therefore the question remains open whether the conditions for such an unsophisticated goal as visa-free movement were set too high .
The example of Moldova may be recalled here. In the years 2010-2011, when negotiations on the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans (VLAP) were launched, Ukraine seemed the best candidate for relaxing the visa regime. But, it is Moldova, who promptly followed all EU recommendations, who has lately been invited to accede to the second phase of VLAP’s implementation. Although the visa rejection rate at the Schengen consulates in Moldova is much higher than in Ukraine, Ukraine is now lagging behind.. Belarus is not even in the game. Since its government is not eager to sign any accord with the EU and is unwilling to fulfill even less stringent EU preconditions, its citizens still need to pay 60 euros for a Schengen visa. In the meantime, Russia has been strongly pushing for visa abolition without the requirement to conduct in-depth reforms and its efforts have been supported by many influential business circles in the EU.
Obviously Moldova should be rewarded for its efforts, but the societies of Ukraine and Belarus should not be left holding their breath for open and friendly borders with the EU. It is then worth considering lifting the visa requirement for specific categories of people (bona fide travelers, business people, students and youth, individuals mentioned in visa facilitation agreements, tourists), who pose a low migration risk and who could offer EU member states considerable economic and social benefits.
Security dilemmas
The current border control regime at the EU’s eastern frontier has features of an ‘iron curtain’ that divides the Western and Eastern parts of the European continent. People in EaP countries see obstacles to obtaining Schengen visas as unfair. Visa free movement is the best conveyor belt to transfer EU models and practices and the most efficient instrument for grassroots democracy promotion.
Yet no EU government in its right mind will abolish the visa requirement for any country if there is a high migration risk and insufficient trust and advanced cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Such a step may be possible only when the EU is sure that visa abolition will not lead to increased migration, particularly of irregular character, or with prevalent abuses of the asylum system.
The EU is a highly attractive destination for migrants from all over the world. At the same time, European societies, particularly those with long immigration experience, are less and less willing to bear the social costs related to the reception and integration of arriving immigrants. This trend is best illustrated by the latest significant, albeit not dramatic, upsurge in asylum claims (mostly unfounded) from Western Balkans states’ citizens after the EU abolished visa requirements for them. As a consequence, in October 2012, several EU interior ministers demanded from the European Commission faster action to allow for the suspension of the visa-free clause for Western Balkan states.
Why the V4?
Obviously if visa-free movement is suspended for the Balkan states, this will bode ill for any loosening of restrictions on free movement in the EU neighborhood. A few concrete steps could be made in the short-term to soften entry conditions for Eastern European citizens and facilitate further talks on visa abolition. The Visegrad states with their collective memory of restrictions to people’s movement during the Cold war and the high political priority accorded to the Eastern Partnership could play a special role here.
First of all, the V4 states should decide whether it is high time to start speaking and acting with one voice on visa and migration issues. In the aftermath of the EU enlargement, the Visegrad states took different positions with regard to the introduction of visa for Eastern European neighbours. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were the first to establish their visa regimes in 2000-2001, Hungary did the same (with a temporary exception for Ukrainians), and Poland set up theirs the latest, in 2003 with clear prompting by the EU. Nor did the Visegrad states coordinate their policy on the so-called national long-term visas. In 2011 to facilitate people-to-people contacts with Belarusians, Poland, later joined by Latvia, Estonia and Germany, waived fees for that type of visa. Hungary, Slovakia and Poland simplified its visa policy for Ukrainians, but each state has applied their own particular solution.
Secondly, as a first entry point for Eastern European travelers, V4 states could widely share their experience of contacts with that group, including their assessment of irregular migration risk. Much information on Eastern European migration patterns have already been gathered by V4 governmental and non-governmental experts, however that expertise was not publicized in the EU. A notable exception is the Prague Process – an inter-governmental platform created in 2009 for migration partnership between the EU and its neighbors East and South aimed, inter alia, at the preparation of uniform migration profiles for Eastern European states. At the same time no comprehensive research on links between possible visa abolition for Eastern Europeans and Russians and immigration to the EU has been conducted so far.
And last but not least, V4 states could attempt to convince other EU states not to be afraid of uncontrolled migration pressure from Eastern Europe. There are many reasons for this, starting with the unfavorable demographic indicators in Eastern Europe and thus the limited possibilities for any increased long-term emigration to the EU. Besides, the main destination for Eastern European migration is Russia. Moreover, travelers from the region are leading the worldwide statistics of issued Schengen visa (in 2011 Russians obtained 5.2 million Schengen visa, Ukrainians – 1.1 million and Belarusians – 0.5 million) which means that these people have already been to the EU.
The example of the local border traffic regime between Poland and Russian Kaliningrad oblast and Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine evidently shows that, in general, Eastern European citizens are bona fide tourists who do not break the rules of stay of the visiting states and leave a lot of money in the neighbouring EU countries. Examples of the rather poor Polish eastern regions who got a bump as a result of the tourists’ spending may be recalled. According to Polish Border Guard statistics, in 2012 almost six million Ukrainians crossed the Polish border under the local border traffic regime. And as the results’ of the survey conducted by the Polish Statistical Bureau showed – each visitor spent on average around 150 euros. In general, the Bureau estimates that in the fourth quarter of 2012 visitors from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia spent around 1.6 million euros on goods (appliances, electronics, building materials and clothing) and services (accommodation and board) in Poland. In these times of economic crisis, this argument should be of particular importance.
Source: V4/Revue
